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A CONVERSATIONAL MODEL OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION
Summary
A conversational model of causal explanation is outlined, 
which emphasises the role of counterfactual reasoning, contrast 
cases and conversational constraints in causal explanation. It is 
used to organise existing models of causal attribution, to 
integrate attribution research with other models of causal 
reasoning, and to study explanations in ordinary language.
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In this review I present a conversational model of causal 
explanation, which emphasises the role of counterfactual 
reasoning, contrast cases, and conversational constraints in 
explanation. I show how this model can be applied to analysis of 
information in Kelley's (1967) cube and provides an organising 
framework for various attribution theories. I then show how it 
can be extended to analyse explanations given on the basis of 
naturalistic causal scenarios expressed in ordinary language. The 
conversational model of causal explanation thus provides a 
simple, parsimonious and unifying framework for understanding 
causal explanation.
A CONVERSATIONAL MODEL OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION
Hilton (1988; 1990) elaborated on the proposals of Hesslow 
(1983; 1984; 1988) that causal explanation proceeds by comparing 
a target case with a counterfactual contrast case. Every why- 
question thus has an implicit rather than built into it.
In counterfactual reasoning, we compare the case in which 
the target event happened to a counterfactual case in which the 
target event did not happen. The factor that is not shared by the 
target case and the contrast case is focused as "the" 
explanation, whereas the factors shared by both cases are treated 
as backgrounded presuppositions. For example, we are sometimes 
able to explain an event by contrasting it to the counterfactual 
case which never happened. One example would be the explanation 
given for the U.S. decision to drop an atomic bomb on Japan in 
1945 by. recourse to what might have happened if they had not done 
so. The question "Why did the U.S. drop the atom bomb" is thus, 
implicitly, "Why did the U.S. drop the atom bomb when they could 
have beaten Japan by conventional means?". The explanation that
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Justified this decision is that hundreds of thousands of lives 
were saved because the Allies did not have to engage in the 
costly process of defeating Japan by taking successive Pacific 
islands at enormous human sacrifice. This consideration is thus 
not only a necessary one for the decision, but also is 
"sufficient in the circumstances" for it, and is thus dignified 
as its cause (cf. Mackie, 1974).
Clearly, another "necessary condition" for dropping the bomb 
is that the U.S. and Japan were at war with each other, but since 
this condition was true of both the target scenario and the 
counterfactual scenario, it has no explanatory value and is 
treated as part of the "causal field" of backgrounded necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for the event (Mackie, 1974).
Thus, to understand a causal question, we must understand 
the implicit contrast it presupposes (Hesslow, 1986). 
Consequently, the proper unit of analysis in causal explanation 
is the question-answer pair (Turnbull and Slugoski, 1988). The 
same surface causal question can be given different meanings if 
the implicit contrast is changed. Suppose the implicit question 
is "why did the U.S. drop the atom bomb on Japan (in 1945, rather 
than on North Korea in 1951)?". Here the answer might refer to 
the fact that the U.S. was not afraid of nuclear retaliation from 
Japan's allies in 1945, as it would have been if it had dropped 
an atom bomb on North Korea in 1951.
In addition, causal explanations are constrained by maxims 
of conversation (Hilton, 1990). Thus they should be probably 
true, informative, relevant and clear (Grice, 1975). As we shall 
see later, observance of these maxims has important implications 
for the study of processes of causal explanation. Immediately 
below, however, I address the question of how traditional models 
of causal attribution can be illuminated by the conversational
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model of causal explanation, and brought into a single unifying 
framework based on counterfactual reasoning. 1 then show how the 
conversational model opens up new questions in the study of 
causal explanation processes.
THE "MAN-THE-SCIENTIST ANALOGY OF CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION: 
DEVELOPMENTS AND REFORMULATIONS
Research in attribution theory has been dominated by 
Heider's (1958) "man-the-scientist" analogy. Heider proposed that 
the layperson makes causal attributions in much the same way that 
a scientist does, namely through use of Mill's method of 
difference. Heider's ideas were taken over and given their most 
influential formulation by Kelley (1967) in the so-called ANOVA 
model, and it is this formulation that will prove the foundation 
for much of the research described in this article.
Kelley, following Mill, defined a cause as "that condition 
which is present when the effect is present and which is absent 
when the effect is absent" (1967, p. 154). Given an event such as 
John 1auqhed at the comedian. this logic implies that certain 
"control" conditions should be examined to determine the cause of 
the event. Thus if we wish to determine whether the person (i.e. 
John) is the cause, we should examine consensus information to 
determine whether other people laugh at the comedian or not. If 
we wish to determine whether the stimulus (i.e. the comedian) is 
the cause, then we should examine distinctiveness information to 
determine whether John laughs at other comedians or not. Finally, 
if we wish to determine whether the present circumstances 
(sometimes called occasion or time) is the cause, then we should 
examine consistency information to see if John laughs at this 
comedian on other occasions.
As Mackie (1974) notes, Mill's method of difference is a
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specific example of counterfactual reasoning. The target case, or 
set of cases, (where the effect occurs) is compared to a contrast 
case (where the effect does or does not occur). Paradoxically, 
though Kelley (1967) stated this logic of "controlled 
experimentation" clearly, he and others did not elaborate and 
test this logic in subsequent experiments on attribution 
processes (McArthur, 1972; 1976; Orvis, Cunningham and Kelley, 
1975). For example, Kelley (1967) only made predictions for three 
of the eight possible cells made by crossing high and low levels 
of consensus, distinctiveness and consistency information.
The formalisation of how Mill's method of difference should 
be applied to the analysis of consensus, distinctiveness and 
consistency information had to await the development of the 
inductive logic model of causal attribution (Jaspars, Hewstone 
and Fincham, 1963). Jaspars et al. (1963) noted that it was 
impossible to conduct an analysis of variance or its formal 
equivalent on the information pattern provided to subjects by 
McArthur (1972). A little reflection will suffice to reveal that 
in any experiment designed to test the operation of three factors 
(person, stimulus, occasion) in a fully-crossed 2x2x2 design, 
eight cells of information are necessary. In McArthur's (1972) 
experiment subjects were provided with only four, namely the 
target event in combination with consensus, distinctiveness and 
consistency information. Consequently, four cells of information 
are missing, rendering the "experimental design" equivalent to a 
fractionated block design in which analysis of interactions is 
impossible.
Although an ANOVA-like analysis is impossible on the 
information given in McArthur's experiment, it is still possible 
to apply Mill's method of difference to the information provided. 
Specifically, given a target event such as John 1aughs at the
4
comedian. Jaspars proposed that low consensus (i.e. no-one else 
laughs at the comedian) indicates the target person as a cause 
because the effect is present when the target person is present, 
but not when other target persons are present. Likewise, high 
distinctiveness (i.e. John laughs at no other comedians) 
indicates the target stimulus as cause because the effect occurs 
when the target stimulus is present but not when other stimuli 
are present. Finally, low consistency (i.e. John has never 
laughed at the comedian before) indicates that the present 
occasion is the cause, because the target event occurs on this 
occasion but not on others.
The inductive logic model also predicts interactional 
attributions, through joint coding of factors. Thus the LHH (low 
consensus, high distinctiveness and high consistency 
configuration) indicates the combination of the person and the 
stimulus as cause. This is because the effect occurs only when 
the joint condition of person and the stimulus together is 
present (target event, high consistency) and does not occur when 
the joint condition of the person and stimulus together is absent 
(low consensus, high distinctiveness).
This last set of interactional predictions led Jaspars to an 
important procedural innovation. Jaspars (1983) explicitly 
specified all the possible response combinations created by 
combinations of the person, stimulus and circumstances; i.e. 
person, stimulus, circumstances, person x stimulus, person x 
circumstances, stimulus x circumstances, and person x stimulus x 
circumstances. McArthur (1972) on the other hand, only explicitly 
specified "main effect" attributions (person, stimulus, 
circumstances) in her response format, and asked subjects to 
write any interactional attributions down. The difference in
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response formats seems to have had a strong effect on the 
proclivity to produce interactional attributions. Those studies 
which used full response formats produced 61% (Jaspars, 1983) and 
48% (Hilton and Jaspars, 1987) interactional attributions, 
whereas those that did not only produced 35% (McArthur, 1972) and 
37% (Hewstone and Jaspars, 1983). Consequently, the earlier study 
by McArthur (1972) may have seriously underestimated subjects' 
ability to produce appropriate interactional attributions.
Following the inductive logic model, the predictions 
detailed in the left-hand column of Table 1 can be derived.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Further details of the inductive logic model are detailed in 
Hewstone and Jaspars (1987), Jaspars (1988) and Jaspars, Hewstone 
and Fincham (1983). Studies designed to test the inductive logic 
model provided an impressive degree of confirmation for the model 
(Hilton and Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, 1983). Moreover, re-analyses 
of the data of Hewstone and Jaspars (1983) and McArthur (1972) 
also provided strong support for the inductive logic model 
(Hewstone and Jaspars, 1987).
As Hilton, Smith and Alicke (1988) noted, the inductive 
logic model proposes that low consensus information leads to 
person attribution and high distinctiveness information leads to 
stimulus attribution, whereas most other models of causal 
attribution propose that high consensus information leads to 
stimulus attribution and low distinctiveness information leads to 
person attribution (Alicke and Insko, 1984; Anderson, 1978; 
Bassili and Regan, 1977; DiVitto and McArthur, 1978; Garland, 
Hardy and Stephenson, 1975; Hansen, 1980; Hortacsu, 1987; Kassin, 
1979; Major, 1980; McArthur, 1972; 1976; Orvis et al., 1975). 
Both the inductive logic models and the other models, such as
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that or Orvis et al. (1975), posit that high consistency leads to 
circumstance attributions (see Table 2).
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Although the consensus-stimulus and distinctiveness-stimulus 
links proposed by the latter models deviate from the 
counterfactual logic implicit in Kelley's (1967) definition of 
causality, they clearly have won widespread acceptance. 
Intuitively, there does seem to be sense in the claim that 
consensus information is somehow "about" the stimulus and 
distinctiveness information is intuitively "about" the person 
(Higgins and Bargh, 1987 ). Below, we shall review a proposal 
which integrates the position of the inductive logic model 
(Jaspars et al., 1983) with that of Orvis et al.'s (1975) 
template-matching model (Hilton, 1989b). Specifically, it is 
argued that causal explanation must be distinguished from 
dispositional attribution. When this is done it is possible to 
see that causal explanation is achieved through the application 
of Mill's method of difference (i.e. counterfactual reasoning) 
and dispositional attribution through application of Mill's 
method of agreement.
Causal explanation and dispositional attribution 
Causal explanation and dispositional attribution are not the 
same thing. In causal explanation we explain why a particular 
event happened, whereas in dispositional attribution we attribute 
a general pattern of behaviour to an underlying characteristic of 
one or more of the entities involved.
Certain covariation configurations identify the same entity 
as the cause of the event to be explained, and as having an 
underlying disposition to produce the kind of behaviour in 
question. These are the low consensus, low distinctiveness and
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high consistency (LLH) and high consensus, high distinctiveness 
and high consistency (HHH) configurations. For example, in the 
LLH configuration below, we would say that Paul is a generally 
helpful person (dispositional attribution), and that this is the 
cause of his helping Linda (causal explanation).
Paul helps Linda
Hardly anyone else who knows her helps Linda
Paul helps almost everyone else he knows
In the past, Paul has almost always helped Linda
There has been perhaps a tendency to assume that covariation
configurations always imply dispositional attributions to those
entities that they identify as causes. This tendency would have
been exacerbated by the fact that Kelley (1967) only made
predictions for the LLH and HHH cells, and that McArthur (1972)
focused on !,main effect" attributions to the person, stimulus or
circumstances at the expense of interactional attributions.
An interesting contrast emerges when we compare the causal
inferences that can be made from the high consensus, low
distinctiveness and low consistency (HLL) configuration below:
Paul helps Linda
Almost everyone else who knows her helps Linda 
Paul helps almost everyone else he knows 
In the past, Paul has hardly ever helped Linda
In properly designed attribution experiments with full response
formats (see above), the cause is predominantly attributed to the
circumstances (Hilton and Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, 1983), the
present occasion (Hilton and Slugoski, 1986) or time 
o
(Forsterling, 1989), depending on the specific phrasing used. 
However, although Paul does not usually help Linda, he would 
still seem to be a generally helpful person because he helps most 
people. Although we would attribute the cause of his helping 
Linda here to something about the specific occasion (causal
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explanation), we would probably still make the inference that he 
is a helpful person in general (dispositional attribution).
The methods of difference and agreement
Hilton (1989b) presented a functional model of social 
inference which argues that causal explanations are produced by 
Mill's method of difference, whereas dispositional attributions 
are produced by Mill's method of agreement. The model is 
functional because different methods of induction are depending 
on the goal of the inference process.
Mill's method of difference is used to explain why a 
particular event occurred. It involves comparing a target event 
to a comparison event (or, as instantiated by the inductive logic 
model of Jaspars et al., 1983, a set of events). Consequently, 
the "control condition" for assessing the causal role of the 
person would be to determine whether the effect occurs in the 
presence of other persons or not (consensus information). If the 
target event occurs when the target person is present but does 
not occur when the target person is absent (low distinctiveness), 
then the case in which the target event occurs differs from the 
others in which it does not occur in that Paul is present whereas 
he is absent in the other cases. Consequently, something about 
the target person is designated as the cause that "makes the 
difference" (see Table 3).
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
However, when we learn that Paul helps most people (low 
distinctiveness), we make the dispositional attribution that Paul 
is a helpful guy. This dispositional attribution is accomplished 
by a process analogous to Mill's (1872/1973) method of agreement. 
Here all the cases in which the effect occurs agree in having 
Paul present (see Table 4). Consequently, high consensus will
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INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
predict dispositional attribution to the stimulus because all 
examples agree in having the target stimulus present when the 
effect occurs, and low distinctiveness will lead to stimulus 
dispositional attributions because all examples agree in having 
the target person present when the effect occurs. High 
consistency should also lead to dispositional attribution to the 
person and the stimulus because all cases agree in having the 
person and the stimulus present when the effect occurs. However, 
the the amount of dispositional attribution under high 
consistency may be expected to be smaller than under high 
consensus and low consistency because a) the behavior is 
attributed to two sources (the person and the stimulus) rather 
than one (the person or the stimulus), and b) the generalization 
of the target event over other times alone does not imply the 
same amount of generalization as the consensus and 
distinctiveness dimensions, which imply generalization of the 
effect over other persons and times, and other stimuli and times, 
respectively.
When the subject is required to explain why the target event 
happened in experiments using the paradigm of McArthur (1972), 
the results are consistent with the application of the method of 
difference, with the exception of the high consensus, low 
distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) cell (Hewstone and 
Jaspars, 1987; Hilton and Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, 1983). None 
of these experiments asked subjects to make dispositional 
attributions, however. Hilton (1989b) did not ask subjects to 
produce causal explanations as in the other studies, but to make 
dispositional attributions from covariation information, and
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found the judgments predicted by application of the method of 
agreement specified above. High consensus led to stimulus 
dispositional attributions and low distinctiveness to person 
dispositional attributions, and high consistency to moderate 
dispositional attributions to the person and the stimulus. In 
contrast to the very strong effects obtained in support of the 
operation of the method of agreement, there was little support 
for the operation of the application of the method of difference. 
Thus there no effect of consensus on person attributions and only 
a relatively small effect of high distinctiveness on stimulus 
attributions.
The functional model of social inference thus appears to fit 
the data well. It also helps explain some previous 
inconsistencies. For example, Iacobucci and McGill (in press) re­
analysed the data of several attribution experiments (Hewstone 
and Jaspars, 1987; Hilton and Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, 1983; 
McArthur, 1972) using log-linear techniques. They found that 
although the inductive logic model of Jaspars et al. (1983) fit 
these data better than the template-matching model of Orvis et 
al. (1975), "residual variance" still needed to be accounted for 
by the consensus-stimulus and distinctiveness-person inferential 
links posited by the template matching model. This pattern would 
be predicted if subjects tended to treat the causal explanation 
task as a dispositional attribution task. Finally, the functional 
model predicts the information acquisition results obtained by 
Hilton, Smith and Alicke (1988), who found in some conditions 
that subjects were more likely to prefer consensus information 
when asked to explain a sporting performance than when they were 
asked to evaluate how good the person performing the event was, 
i.e. to make a dispositional attribution of ability to him.
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The functional model of social inference thus clarifies 
aspects of the attribution process. A full treatment of this 
model is not possible here (but see Hilton and Smith, 1990). For 
present purposes, its main advantage is to show that 
counterfactual reasoning, in the form of Mill's method of 
difference, is used to provide causal explanations of an event. 
Below, we address the question of how real-world knowledge is 
combined with explicitly given information in the causal 
attribution process.
WORLD KNOWLEDGE AND THE PROCESS OF CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION
The abnormal conditions focus model
Hilton and Slugoski (1986) noted that people bring real- 
world expectancies with them to the attribution task. They based 
their analysis on the criticisms made of the Millian definition 
of causality given by the legal theorists, Hart and Honoré
(1985). Specifically, Hart and Honoré (1985) argued that the 
method of difference could reveal an innumerable number of 
necessary conditions but for which a target event would not have 
happened. For example, if a train crashes, we may be able to 
reason counterfactually that the train would not have crashed if 
the train had not been travelling so fast, or if it had not been 
so heavily laden, or if there had not been a bent rail in the 
track, and so on. Thus the crash could be attributed to any one 
of a plethora of necessary conditions. However, in normal 
conversation, we typically tend to mention only one factor as 
"the" cause in causal explanation. This raises the problem of 
how to select causes from conditions. Hart and Honoré (1985) 
proposed that we normally compare the target event to the normal 
case to see what is abnormal about the target event. Thus, if the 
train normally travels at that speed and laden at that weight
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without crashing, then the bent rail is identified as the
abnormal condition as that "makes the difference" to the train
crashing or not crashing. It is thus dignified as "the" cause
whereas the speed and weight of the train are relegated to the
status of mere conditions which serve as background information
(cf. Mackie's (1974) notion of a "causal field").
As will be shown later, the abnormal conditions focus model
can be applied to a wide range of causal explanation tasks.
However, Hilton and Slugoski (1986) began by applying it to the
analysis of causal attribution in the McArthur (1972) paradigm.
Specifically, they proposed that low consensus throws the person
into focus as abnormal, high distinctiveness throws the stimulus
into person as abnormal, and low consistency throws the present
occasion into focus as abnormal. In their first experiment they
verified these predictions by showing that subjects judged these
items to be informative about the predicted targets.
Although all the details cannot be given here, Hilton and
Slugoski (1986) then applied their model to the analysis of the
problematic high consensus, low distinctiveness and high
consistency (HLH) configuration discussed above. According to the
inductive logic model of Jaspars et al. (1983), no attribution
should be possible here because the occurrence of the target
event generalises over other persons, stimuli and times. However,
experimental results show that subjects reliably attribute the
target event to either the person, the stimulus or a combination
of the person and the stimulus in this condition (see Table 2).
This result seems intuitively quite reasonable if we consider the
configuration below:
Ralph trips up over Linda dancing
Almost everyone else trips up over Linda dancing 
Linda trips up over almost everyone else dancing 
In the past, Ralph has almost always tripped up over Linda
13
dancing
The logical conclusion would seem to be that Ralph is a clod and
Linda is a clod (cf. McArthur (1972). Indeed, Hilton and Slugoski
(1986) found that subjects attribute this event to multiple
sufficient causes, i.e. "Something special about Ralph and Linda
(even when they are not together)". In effect, Ralph and Linda
are being identified as abnormal (i.e. clumsier than the average
dancer). Consistent with this reasoning, Hilton and Slugoski
(1986, Expt 1) showed that subjects perceived high consensus to
be informative about the stimulus and low distinctiveness to be
informative about the person.
However, the perceived normality of the target event appears
to affect the attribition process (cf. Hart and Honoré, 1985). If
the target event to be explained is highly normal (e.g. buying
something in a supermarket), then the conclusions suggested by
the same HLH configuration appear to be quite different:
Sally buys something on her visit to the supermarket
Almost everyone else buys something on their visit to this 
supermarket
Sally buys something on her visit to almost every other 
supermarket
In the past Sally has almost always bought something on her 
visit to this supermarket
Here, subjects attribute the event to the null option "Nothing
special about Sally, the supermarket, the present occasion or any
combination of the three” (Hilton and Slugoski, 1986), as
predicted by the inductive logic model of Jaspars et al. (1983).
Neither the person nor the stimulus are identified as the cause
in this condition, since neither is identified by the covariation
information as an abnormal condition. Consistent with this,
neither low distinctiveness or high consensus were judged to be
informative about the person or the stimulus when the target
event was normal (Hilton and Slugoski, Expt. 1).
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Norms and the missing dimensions of covariation information
Most experiments on attribution processes (Hewstone and 
Jaspars, 1983; Hilton and Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 
1972; 1976; Orvis et al., 1975) only presented subjects with 
information from four of the eight cells required to test for the 
causal effect of the person, stimulus and occasion using an 
analysis of variance or its formal equivalent. The one early 
exception was the experiment of Pruitt and Insko (1980), which 
presented subjects with a fifth dimension, namely comparison- 
object consensus information about the behaviour of other persons 
to other stimuli, e.g. about what other people do on visits to 
other restaurants.
Hilton (1988; 1990) elaborated the theoretical position of 
Hilton and Slugoski (1986) and proposed that subjects' real-world 
knowledge served the function of filling out the "missing 
dimensions” of Kelley's (1967) cube in experiments using the 
paradigm of McArthur (1972). This can most easily be seen by 
considering Figure 1, where the above target events are
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
represented in 2x2 matrices. The consistency dimension has been 
omitted for reasons of clarity of exposition. The occurrence of 
an event in a given cell is signified by a "1", and its non­
occurrence by a "0", and its occasional occurrence by "1/2". In 
both matrices, a "1" is used to signify the occurrence of the 
target event when the target person and stimulus are both present 
(the target event itself), when the target person is present with 
other stimuli (low distinctiveness), and when other persons are 
present with the target stimulus (high consensus). The difference 
between the two matrices comes in how the bottom right-hand cell 
is fi11ed.
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Thus, subjects appear to have knowledge of what normally 
happens when people go dancing or shopping in supermarkets. These 
may be expressed as norms. i.e. generalizations of the form Some 
people trip up over other people dancing sometimes or Most people 
buy things on most visits to most supermarkets. These norms may 
perhaps be thought of as being the lay equivalent of "covering 
laws” (cf. Hempel, 1965). This implicit world knowledge is then 
used to fill in information in the "missing cell" about what 
other persons do with other stimuli. Thus we would fill the 
missing cell with a "1" in the case of the supermarket example 
because normally most people buy something on their visit to 
most supermarkets, whereas we would only fill the missing cell 
with a "1/2" in the dancing example to indicate that normally 
some people trip up over some people dancing.
If we then perform informal equivalents of the analysis of 
variance on the two matrices, we obtain results that correspond 
to the responses that subjects give in these experiments. Thus, 
in the supermarket example, we obtain no effects at all 
(corresponding to the null option) and in the dancing example we 
obtain two main effects (corresponding to two sufficient causes).
Thus subjects appear to supplant the experimenter-provided 
information with their own world-knowledge to "complete the 
design” of the Kelley cube. When they have done this, they 
produce responses that would be predicted by a normative analysis 
of variance. This result stands against the widely held view that 
subjects "underuse" base-rate unformation (e.g. Nisbett and Ross, 
1980). Rather, in this case, it seems to have been the 
experimenters who have generally overlooked the importance of 
base rate information by omitting to supply information in the 
form of norms to subjects. Paradoxically, it is the subjects who
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made good this lack by supplying this information from their own 
world knowledge.
It would seem that subjects are considerably more rational 
in using covariation information to make causal inferences than 
has been previously supposed. This supposition is confirmed by 
recent research in which subjects have been explicitly given 
information in all eight cells of Kelley's (1967) cube. When this 
is done, subjects produce inferences that correspond very closely 
to those that would be predicted by a normative analysis of 
variance (Cheng and Novick, 1990; Forsterling, 1989; 1990). 
Comparable results were obtained by Pruitt and Insko (1980), who 
explicitly supplied a fifth dimension of comparison-object 
consensus information to their subjects. One striking feature of 
all these experiments is the extent to which they support the 
hypothesis that the method of difference is used to produce 
causal explanations. Thus consensus information affects person 
explanations, distinctiveness information affects stimulus 
explanations and consistency information affects circumstance/ 
occasion/time explanations. Particularly noteworthy is the 
finding that consensus information, far from being underused 
(McArthur, 1972; 1976; Nisbett and Borgida, 1975), has a 
consistently strong and predictable effect on person 
explanations.
One consequence of these findings would be to conclude that 
Kelley's (1967) ANOVA analogy actually describes subjects' causal 
inference processes very well. The failure to recognize this 
earlier is due to four main reasons. First, early theorists 
(McArthur, 1972; Orvis et al. 1975) did not take Kelley’s (1967) 
suggestions to their logical conclusion. They therefore did not 
recognize that models (e.g. the template-matching model) that 
proposed consensus-stimulus and distinctiveness-person
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inferential links deviated from the canons of Mill's method of 
difference. Second, by using response formats that were 
incomplete and ambiguous, their experimental procedures appear to 
have biased the results obtained (cf. Cheng and Novick, 1990; 
Forsterling, 1969; Hewstone and Jaspars, 1967; Hilton and 
Jaspars, 1987; Hilton and Knibbs, 1988). And third, by either 
omitting complete information from the cube, or overlooking the 
role of subjects' presuppositions in "filling out" missing cells, 
theorists underestimated subjects' ability to reason according to 
the canons of an intuitive analysis of variance. In fact, 
subjects do indeed use consensus and base-rate information in the 
form of norms appropriately and normatively.
Counterfactual reasoning as a model of causal explanation 
As noted above, the conversational model causal explanation 
proposes that every why-question thus has an implicit rather than 
built into it, and that in order to understand a request for a 
causal explanation for an event, one must understand the implicit 
contrast drawn in the why question. Using this simple logic, one 
is able to see that the variegated attribution theories appear to 
share the same counterfactual logic, but to address questions 
which presuppose different contrasts (See Table 5; also Lipe, in 
press, for a similar proposal).
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Thus the inductive logic model of Jaspars et al. (1983), 
which instantiates Kelley's (1967 p.194) definition of a cause as 
"that condition which is present when the effect is present and 
which is absent when the effect is absent" addresses the question 
"Why did this event occur rather than not occur?" (Why x rather 
than not x?). The abnormal conditions focus model of Hilton and
*
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Slugoski (1966) addresses the question "Why did this event occur 
rather than the normal case?" (Why x rather than the default 
value for x?). Jones and Davis's (1965) theory of correspondent 
inference addresses the question "Why did the actor make this 
choice rather than that choice?" (Why x rather than y?). Fincham 
and Jaspars1 (1980) entailment model of the attribution of 
responsibility addresses the question "Why did the actor do what 
he did rather than what he should have done?" (Why x rather than 
the moral or legal ideal?". Schank and Abelson's (1977; see also 
Carbonell, 1981; Wilensky, 1981; 1983) model answers questions 
like "Why did this plan fail rather than succeed?" (Why x rather 
than the projected aim) and "Why did the actor value this goal 
rather than that goal?" (Why x rather than y?).
Counterfactual reasoning and ordinary 1anguage
Although considerable progress has been made in modelling 
causal inference in specific and artificial experimental 
paradigms, such as that of McArthur (1972), the question still 
arises as to what extent these inference processes occur in 
other, more natural settings.
Thus, consistent with the abnormal conditions focus model 
(Hilton and Slugoski, 1986), unanticipated events appear to 
attract attention and to initiate attributional processing 
(Weiner, 1985). Events may be unanticipated because they are 
unusual (Hastie, 1984), or represent failure (Bohner, Bless, 
Schwarz and Strack, 1988), or are cognitively imbalanced in 
Heider’s (1958) sense (Brown and van Kleeck, 1989).
There is also considerable evidence that people’s 
representations of stories are best represented by an adaptation 
of Mackie's (1974) counterfactual test. If, by the counterfactual 
test, one event is deemed necessary in the circumstances for
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another to occur, then a link is established between the two. The 
network of interconnections built up by this test (Trabasso and 
Sperry, 1985; Trabasso, Sperry and van den Broek, 1985; van den 
Broek and Trabasso, 1986) predicts story event importance and 
recall better than formalisms derived from Schank and Abelson's 
(1977) model of text comprehension (Graesser et al., 1980; 
Graesser et al., 1981). Thus richly connected events are more 
likely to judged as important and be recalled than poorly 
connected events.
While people's representations of story-lines may be 
constituted of complex networks of interlocking conditions the 
problem of causal selection once again presents itself. How do we 
decide which member of a complex set of conditions to mention as 
"the" cause? Mill (1872/1973) himself noticed that people often 
omitted necessary conditions from causal explanations, instead 
focusing on the one that "completes the tale", and regarded this 
as "capricious" iSystem of Logic. Book III, Chapter v, Section 
iii). In fact, selection of causes from conditions in ordinary 
language seems to be quite orderly, and governed by general rules 
of discourse (Grice, 1975; Hilton, 1990; Hilton and Slugoski, 
1986).
Generally speaking, causation tends be attributed to the 
factor that "could have been otherwise", i.e. that factor for 
which it is possible to imagine a counterfactual alternative. 
Abnormal conditions are easily mutable whereas normal conditions 
are not, and thus get focussed as causes (cf. Kahneman and 
Miller, 1986). This can be seen from research on people's 
perceptions of accidents. Accidents are typically caused by 
unfortunate combinations of factors. However, when asked 
retrospectively to "undo" a factor that led to an event, people
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spontaneously focus on abnormal rather than normal conditions 
(Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). People 
are more likely to say "If only he had gone home by his normal 
route" (thus undoing the fact that the victim went home by an 
abnormal route) than "If only he had gone home by a different 
route" (thus undoing the fact that the victim went home by his 
normal route). Consistent with the view that abnormal conditions 
become focused as causes, Wells and Gavanski (1969) report 
further evidence that those conditions that people are most 
likely to "undo" are those that are most likely to be judged as 
causes.
In a provocative study, Brown and Fish (1983) suggest that 
people vary more in their disposition to perform actions than in 
their disposition be acted upon, whereas the reverse holds true 
for emotions. For example, people seem to vary more in their 
disposition or ability to help than to be helped, whereas they 
vary more in their ability to elicit liking than to like (but see 
Au, 1986; Hoffman and Tchir, in press, for exceptions). 
Consistent with this, the trait adjectives derived from action 
verbs tend to describe a characteristic of the person performing 
the action (helpful, charming, etc.) whereas trait adjectives 
derived from state verbs tend to describe a characteristic of 
the person eliciting the state or emotion (likeable, hateful, 
etc.). In the sample of verbs studied by Brown and Fish (1983), 
this rule is observed in over 90% of cases. This tendency 
suggests that language affords us trait adjectives that are most 
likely to help describe the abnormal characteristic wherein a 
person differs from most other people, and which makes a 
difference to the occurrence of the event in question. The 
vocabulary of language itself thus tends to focus on abnormal 
conditions.
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In default of explicit focus, implicit focus appears to be 
on abnormal conditions. However, explicit focus can override 
this. For example, when asked to explain normal states, Gavanski 
and Wells (1990) show that people focus on normal conditions. 
Although ordinary people spontaneously focus on the unusual, the
s
unwanted and the imbalanced (see above), as Hart and Honoré 
(1985) point out, scientists tend to ask why things happen the 
way they normally do, and to explain them in terms of stable 
underlying characteristics.
Sometimes causal explanation will be influenced by subtle 
linguistic focus cues (Moxey and Sanford, 1987). For example, the 
quantifiers "A few" and "Few" denote the same proportion, but 
focus on different aspects of the set that they partition. Thus 
”A few" focuses attention on the minority who did perform the 
behaviour in question, whereas "Few" focuses attention on the 
majority who did not perform the behaviour in question. 
Consequently sentences such as "A few of the M.P.'s went to the 
party because..." should be completed by reasons for going (e.g. 
"they were still in town"), whereas sentences such as "Few of the 
M.P.'s went to the party" should be completed by reasons for not 
going (e.g. "it was boring"). Moxey and Sanford (1987) obtained 
data consistent with these predictions, and extended them to 
frequency quantifiers. Thus events quantified with "occasionally" 
were completed with reasons for doing the action, whereas events 
quantified with "seldom" were quantified with reasons for not 
doing the action.
Finally, various "biases" may be attributable to the 
implicit focus of causal questions, which can be overidden by 
specifying question focus explicitly. Thus McGill (1989) presents 
evidence that actor-observer differences in causal explanation
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may be attributable to implicit question focus. Normally, 
observers asked question such as " Why did your roommate choose 
chemistry?" tend to attribute others' actions to the actor, 
whereas actors asked questions such as "Why did you choose 
chemistry?" tend to attribute their actions to stimuli. However, 
when the actor or object is explicitly focused by focus adjuncts 
such as "in particular" (Quirk, Svartvik, Greenbaum and Leech, 
1972), as in questions such as "Why did you in particular choose 
chemistry?", the bias is greatly attenuated. McGill (1989) 
presents and tests a similar rationale for explaining the 
tendency to explain success in terms of personal factors and 
failure in terms of external factors.
In sum, causal explanation seems to proceed through a 
process of counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning 
appears to underly causal reasoning in comprehension of 
naturalistic stories and scenarios as well as in Kelley's (1967) 
ANOVA analogy. In ordinary language we appear to have natural 
tendencies to focus on the abnormal and to explain it by 
comparing it to the normal. However, this tendency, like actor- 
observer differences in causal explanation, can be reversed by 
use of linguistic focus devices. Causal selection thus appears to 
be determined by linguistic focus rules, which may either be 
implicit (e.g. determined by knowledge about what is normal and 
may be presupposed and what is abnormal and should be focused), 
or explicit (e.g. determined by explicit linguistic focus 
devices).
CONVERSATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON CAUSAL EXPLANATION
Although the research reported above provides strong support 
for the conversational model of causal explanation, it is based 
on experimental data. Although experimental research allows for
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high internal validity due to strict control of variables, it 
runs the risk of low external validity through presenting the 
subject with inference taks that are unrepresentative of those 
encountered in real life. Accordingly it is important to seek 
support for the model with data from natural sources, such as 
newspaper reports. Below, 1 explore the intimate interplay 
between the logic of causal explanation and the rules of 
conversation in New York Times reports on the causes of the 
Challenger space-shuttle disaster. I show how analysis of how a 
real-life explanation is built up reveals processes of causal 
explanation that had not previously been studied in experimental 
research. I then report a series of experimental studies which 
investigate what makes a good explanation.
Maxims of causal explanation
With some exceptions (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Leddo, 
Abelson and Gross, 1984; Read, 1987) researchers on causal 
explanation have on the whole paid little attention to the 
fundamental question of what makes a good explanation, in 
contrast to the effort expended on investigating the internality. 
stability, globality and controllability of explanations. In this 
section I develop the argument that a good explanation is one 
that satisfies Grice's (1975) maxims of conversation.
Grice (1975) proposed that utterances made in normal co­
operative conversation should follow four maxims. The maxim of 
gualitv states that an utterance should be true, or reasonably 
likely to be true. The maxim of quantity states that an utterance 
should be informative. The maxim of relation states that an 
utterance should be relevant and to the point. Finally the maxim 
of manner states that the utterance should be clear. Good 
explanations should satisfy these four maxims (Hilton, 1990).
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Moreover the maxims provide constraints that need to be satisfied 
by any process of explanation generation.
This can be demonstrated with reference to explanations of 
the Challenger disaster. Suppose a completely - uninitiated 
observer, unaware of the workings of space rocketry or of the 
history of the Challenger disaster, were to ask why the accident 
happened and received the answer "Because the spaceship was 
launched in cold weather". Without further information of 
various types, the truth, informativeness, relevance and clarity 
of this explanation remains to be established.
Perhaps the first question to be answered is, how could cold 
weather possibly be connected to the final explosion? To 
understand the relevance of the answer to the causal question, 
the hearer needs to have background information about the 
rocket's structure (e.g. that rubber O-rings were used to seal 
the booster rockets) and some knowledge of the relevant physics 
(e.g that cold weather causes rubber to lose its flexibility, 
hence hindering the seal's efficiency). Consequently, for a given 
explanation to satisfy the maxim of relevance, the hearer must 
have appropriate background knowledge.
Coherent explanations show how a number of relevant facts 
are combined into single underlying "story" through some 
hypothesised process. Part of the final explanation of the 
Challenger disaster runs along the following lines. Cold weather 
made the rubber O-rings inflexible which impeded the efficiency 
of the seals, thus leading to a burn-though of one of the lower 
seals in the left-hand booster rocket. This explains the puff of 
smoke which emerged by the seal during lift off, and why the 
final disaster was sparked by an explosion in this area some 70 
seconds later. It also explains the complete failure to receive 
warnings of the disaster due to the absence of sensors in this
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area of the rocket, other than the loss of power in the left-hand 
booster 4 seconds before the final catastrophe.
Note that in order to satisfy the maxim of quality, the 
explanation must not only itself be true but also coherent with 
background knowledge. Thus it is not enough to know that it was 
cold on the day of lift-off, we must also be confident that the 
other, implied parts of the explanation are also true. For 
example, if we explained the disaster in terms of cold weather on 
the understanding that the intervening cause was that the lift­
off blast blew ice onto the space-shuttle orbiter, whose skin was 
thus punctured, thus leading to disaster, then we would consider 
the explanation untrue if we considered the underlying hypothesis 
to be untrue. In fact, cold weather was cited as a possible cause 
under a "blasted ice" explanation which was then discarded, only 
to be resurrected again as a possible cause under the "faulty 
seal" hypothes i s .
Finally, explanations should satisfy the maxim of quantity. 
If the hearer already knows that the cold weather is part of the 
explanation, then it would be more informative to cite parts of 
the explanation that the hearer does not yet know about, e.g. 
about the flawed performance of the rubber seals in cold weather. 
Likewise, explanations should avoid unclarity. Thus an 
explanation should not use a jargonated term such as "O-rings" if 
the hearer does not know that this refers to the rubber seals.
A model of the process of explanation generation
Hilton, Mathes and Trabasso (in press) outlined a two-stage 
model of explanation generation that satisfies the above 
constraints. The first-stage they termed hypothesis-generation 
and the second they termed explanation-tuning. Hypothesis 
generation corresponds to the process whereby we diagnose what
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the cause of an event is, whereas explanation-tuning refers to 
the process whereby we use our diagnosis to answer some specific 
why-question (cf. Hilton, 1990a).
In the first stage of hypothesis-generation the aim is to 
find the causal explanation of the target event which is most 
probably true. An explanation consists of a number of elements 
(background facts and problematic aspects of the spaceship's 
construction and performance) together with a hypothesis about 
the process which links the problematic aspects together. 
Background facts include basic information which is necessary to 
understand a focal set of events. Thus it is necessary to know 
basic facts about the space-shuttle's construction, such as that 
it is made of three main components (the booster rockets, the 
external fuel tank, and the orbiter carrying the astronauts) in 
order to understand the significance of focal events that make 
the "story" explaining the accident. Problematic aspects are 
facts (e.g. weak seals) and events (the observation of a puff of 
smoke from the seals during lift off from the launch pad)that are 
focal because they may have played a role in the disaster.
At first a candidate explanation may only be very vaguely 
specified. It may, for example, have elements (e.g. weak seals) 
without specifying a process, or hypothesise a process (burn- 
through) without specifying elements. However, more fully-fledged 
hypotheses are grown out of a set of these vague "kernel 
hypotheses" (cf. Abelson and Lalljee, 1988) through processes of 
elaboration (e.g. adding causal links) and further specification 
(being more precise about the elements concerned). These 
hypotheses are evaluated in terms of internal consistency and 
probable truth, until one remains as the most probable 
explanation. Here, the best explanation is the explanation is the
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one that is most likely to be true.
However, good explanations must be more than just true or 
likely to be true, they must also be felicitous (i.e. 
informative, relevant and clear). Consequently, explanations may 
be "tuned" in various ways. For example, the "faulty seals" 
scenario may be felicitously explained in different ways 
depending on the hearer's interests and/or knowledge-state. 
Questions focusing on the role of the design of the shuttle in 
causing the disaster may felicitously be answered by reference to 
the faulty seals, whereas questions focusing on the role of the 
decision to launch may focus on the cold weather. Both 
explanations are equally likely to be true, coming from the same 
causal scenario, but are likely to differ in how well they 
address the implicit focus of a causal question.
The process of specification of explanations offers an 
interesting trade-off between the maxims of quality and quantity. 
A vague explanation, such as "something about the booster rocket" 
is quite likely to be true but too vague to be useful. In fact, 
the New York Times spent a substantial amount of time in further 
specifying this explanation in a process described by Mackie 
(1974) as the "progressive localization of cause" (See Figure 2).
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Note that each time the explanation is changed by being made more 
precise, it is also less likely to be true, since more precise 
explanations have a greater chance of being falsified. That the 
explanations are nevertheless changed In this way clearly 
demonstrates that there is more to a good explanation than simply 
having high truth value. Thus, in this second stage of 
."explanation-tuning", the best explanations are those that are 
more felicitous.
This model of causal explanation has a number of important
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distinctive features. First, it studies how natural explanations 
are grown and elaborated, whereas previous work has studied how 
hypotheses are tested in artificial settings (cf. Bruner, Goodnow 
and Austin, 1956). Although Abelson and Lalljee (1968) have 
proposed a similar model, it remains to be empirically tested. 
The conversational model presupposes the extensive use of 
knowledge-structures of the kind proposed by Abelson and Lalljee
(1988) to build explanations at the hypothesis-generation stage, 
but emphasises the role of conversational maxims (truth, 
informativeness, relevance and clarity) to constrain and "tune" 
the explanations generated. Hilton et al. (in press) outline the 
kind of content analytic techniques necessary to test such a 
model. Second, the conversational model distinguishes between 
different qualities (e.g. truth and felicity conditions) which 
contribute to the quality of an explanation. I show below how 
truth and felicity conditions make separate contributions to the 
quality of an explanation, in a way that has not been recognized 
by previous models of causal explanation.
Context effects on causal explanation: Probability and 
relevance
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) argue persuasively that 
contextual information can have dramatic effects on the quality 
of a target explanation. However, the conversational model of 
causal explanation goes beyond their account in distinguishing 
different ways in which context affects the quality of a causal 
explanation. In particular, the distinction between the 
explanation-generation and explanation-tuning phases of causal 
explanation enables us to discriminate whether new information 
affects the quality of a given explanation by reducing its likely 
truth value (e.g. by suggesting alternative explanations) or by
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reducing its felicity (e.g. by making it uninformative or 
irrelevant to cite, even if it is still true).
This can be illustrated through examples used by Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1986). They give the example of a factory worker who is 
suing the company he works for causing his lung cancer. The 
grounds for his suit are that the cancer rate in this particular 
factory is nine times the rate in comparable industries. However, 
the factory's lawyers counter this claim by arguing that the 
factory worker is a heavy smoker, and that his family have a 
history of lung cancer. Consequently, the effect of the context 
is to weaken belief in the probable truth of the given 
explanation by suggesting that a rival hypothesis be generated. 
Here the rival explanation constitutes outright disagreement over 
what constitutes the true cause. Consistent with this, Hilton
(1989) found that after receiving the contextual information, 
subjects were more likely to judge working in the factory as less 
necessary for the worker to get cancer (Expt. 1), and 
significantly revised their belief that the cancer was caused by 
working in the factory downward (Expt. 2). They also considered 
the explanation to be less informative, relevant, true and good 
(Expt. 3). Thus, the context appears to weaken the quality of 
target explanation through causing its probability to be 
discounted (cf. Kelley, 1972), as well as affecting its 
explanatory relevance, as measured by its perceived 
informativeness and relevance.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) give another persuasive example 
of how context affects the quality of a target explanation. In 
this example, a hammer is observed coming down on a watch, which 
immediately breaks. The best explanation clearly appears to be 
that the watch broke because the hammer hit it. However, when 
contextual information is added that this was done as part of a
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routine testing procedure in a factory, this explanation loses 
its appeal. Instead, people are more likely to say that the watch 
broke because of a fault in the glass.
However, close consideration of this example suggests that 
the context affects the quality of the target explanation for 
quite different reasons than in the lung cancer example. Rather 
than suggest a rival hypothesis, the information that the hammer 
struck the watch as part of a routine testing procedure fleshes 
out the "hammer strike" explanation. It appears still just as 
true that the watch broke as a consequence of the hammer hitting 
it. However, given that the hammer strike is routine, it becomes 
backgrounded as a normal "mere condition" which is not 
informative or relevant to cite in a causal explanation. In this 
context, the fault in the glass becomes the "abnormal condition" 
(Hart and Honoré, 1985; Hilton and Slugoski, 1986) that makes the 
difference between this watch breaking and normal watches which 
do not break. Consistent with this interpretation, Hilton (1989) 
found that adding the context information in this example did not 
lead the target explanation to be considered less necessary 
(Expt. 1), or to significantly revise their belief that the watch 
broke because the hammer hit it. Although they considered the 
target explanation to be less informative, relevant and good, 
they did not change their belief in the truth of the explanation. 
Thus, the context appears to have affected the quality of the 
target explanation through affecting its explanatory relevance 
(perceived informativeness and relevance), but not its probability 
or truth value.
Clearly, context may affect the quality of an explanation 
for different reasons. We may wish to change a given explanation 
either because we feel it to be less likely than the one we
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prefer, or because we feel it to be less informative and 
relevant. Recognizing the deep underlying reasons for the change 
is important. For example, if we believe an explanation for a 
disaster to be less likely we are less likely to act on it. Thus, 
if the fuel tank is discounted as the cause of the Challenger 
disaster we are not likely to want to change its design. However, 
consider the case where we change our explanation of the 
Challenger disaster from "the faulty seals" to "the cold weather" 
to meet the specific contrast implied question as to why 
Challenger exploded on this launch but not others. Although 
uninformative and irrelevant with respect to this specific 
question, the faulty seals still remain a necessary condition for 
the disaster. Moreover, because we still believe that they are 
part of the causal scenario leading to the disaster, we may act 
on this belief and have the seals redesigned so as to avert 
future disasters.
Pragmatic constraints on the selection of causes from 
conditions
Leddo, Abelson and Gross (1984) found that goal-states such 
as "John was hungry" were judged as being more likely to be part 
of the actual explanation of an event such as stopping in at a 
restaurant to eat in than script-preconditions such as "John had 
money in his pocket". Moreover conjunctions of a goal-state and a 
script-precondition, such as "John was hungry and had money in 
his pocket" were judged as more likely explanations than script- 
preconditions such as "John had money in his pocket". Leddo et 
al. (1984) discuss these effects in terms of the greater 
plausibility of the preferred explanations. for example, they 
note that the tendency to rate conjunctive explanations as more 
likely than single explanations to be part of the actual 
explanation appears to break the conjunction rule that no
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conjunction (e.g. A&B) can be more probable than one of its 
conjuncts (e.g. A; see Tversky and Kahneman, 1983).
The conversational model of causal explanation can quite 
naturally explain these results. Goal states are preferred as 
explanations over script-preconditions because they are more 
likely to be "abnormal conditions" (Hart and Honoré, 1985). 
Hilton and Knott (1988) obtained results consistent with this 
position. Goal-states are more likely to be judged as necessary 
and sufficient conditions than script preconditions, which were 
more likely to be judged as necessary but not sufficient 
conditions (Expt. 1). In addition, as would be predicted by the 
conversational model, goal-states were judged as more informative 
and relevant than script-preconditions. However, it was reasoned 
that adding information that a script-precondition held true 
(e.g. having money in one's pocket) would be perceived as more 
informative and relevant when it was already known that the 
relevant goal-state for an action such as eating in a restaurant 
(e.g. being hungry) held true, since it becomes meaningful and 
relevant to check preconditions for a goal-state that is known to 
exist. These predictions were confirmed. When a goal-state was 
included in the context, script-preconditions were judged as more 
informative and relevant than when no goal-state was included in 
the context.
These results are consistent with the predictions of the 
conversational model that the goodness of an explanation is 
affected by its explanatory relevance as well as by its likely 
truth-value. This not to deny, of course, that the quality of an 
explanation is often affected by its perceived probability (cf. 
Leddo et al., 1984). However, the unique contribution of the 
conversational model is to distinguish the role of truth and
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felicity conditions in contributing to the perceived goodness of 
an explanation, and thus to enable us to discriminate the role of 
belief from that of conversational purposes in determining the 
perceived goodness of an explanation.
The explanatory relevance of causal attributions
Finally, it is worth noting that major theories of the 
attribution process have in part finessed the problem of 
explanatory relevance by dealing only with very general, vague 
explanations. Thus most theories of the attribution process 
(Hilton and Slugoski, 1986; Jaspars, Hewstone and Fincham, 1983; 
Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; 1972; 1973) describe how 
laypeople attribute causality for an event to "something" in the 
person, the stimulus or the occasion involved in the production 
of the event, but do not tell us what a good "person", "stimulus" 
or "occasion" explanation might be (cf. Lalljee and Abelson, 
1983). This observation underscores the point that attribution 
theory has been more concerned with the truth of causal 
explanations than their relevance.
As Hilton and Knibbs (1988) note, attribution to vague 
general categories may lead to true but useless explanations. For 
example, Justin may be interested in establishing why Laura 
behaved so coolly to him on a date. Justin may know that Laura 
has behaved this way to him on previous dates (high consistency), 
and have established that she acts coolly to other people on a 
date (low distinctiveness), while most girls simply boil over 
with passion when out with Justin (low consensus). Justin, being 
scientific in his approach to such questions, arrives at the 
logical conclusion that it is something about Laura that is 
causing her to act cool. Still, although very probably true, this 
attribution may not be very relevant to Justin's problem of how
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to Infuse Laura with passion for him. A more specific explanation 
indicating whether Laura’s coolness is due to her being a wilting 
flower or a tough cookie would clearly be a more relevant answer 
to Justin's inquiry, since it would help him further his amorous 
goals.
In related vein, Hampson, John and Goldberg (1986) point out 
that there is often a trade-off between making a specific trait 
attribution and a general one. Do we attribute Mary's successful 
performance on the violin to her being generally talented or 
simply musical? The specific trait attribution is more likely to 
be true, and presupposes the more general one. However, because 
it generalises over fewer situations, it is less likely to be 
informative. Thus, if the goal of the attribution process is to 
be able to predict Mary's future behavior, the general trait 
attribution will have the most explanatory power but the least 
chance of being true. Or, to recast this observation in Gricean 
terms, saying "Mary is talented" on the basis of observing her 
violin playing, would conform to the maxim of quantity at the 
risk of violating the maxim of quality.
CONCLUSIONS
Causal explanation appears to proceed through the 
application of counterfactual reasoning. Recognition of this 
enables attribution theories to be organised into a badly needed 
coherent framework (Hilton, 1988; 1990; see also Lipe, in press, 
for a similar proposal), a task called for by both Kelley and 
Michela (1980) and Harvey and Weary (1984). It also enables 
similarities between causal reasoning in attribution tasks and 
other examples of causal reasoning to be more clearly explicated 
than before. Thus models of counterfactual reasoning based on
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Mackie's (1974) work have been applied in cognitive psychology 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; 1966), decision theory (Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1986) and discourse comprehension (Trabasso and Sperry, 
1985; Trabasso and van den Broek, 1985).
Dispositional attribution, on the other hand, appears to 
proceed through a process analogous to Mill's method of 
agreement. The functional approach is thus able to reconcile 
"difference-based" models (Hewstone and Jaspars, 1987; Hilton and 
Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, 1983; 1988; Jaspars et al., 1983) and 
"agreement-based" models (Alicke and Insko, 1984; Bassili and 
Regan, 1977; Hansen, 1980; McArthur, 1972; 1976; Orvis et al., 
1975) within a single framework. Moreover it predicts when a 
particular method of induction will be used. Thus the method of 
difference will be used to make causal explanations and the 
method of agreement to make dispositional attributions.
The conversational model explains how subjective 
presuppositions are used to "fill out” the missing dimensions in 
Kelley's (1967) cube (Hilton and Slugoski, 1986). When this is 
done, subjects' causal inferences are shown to be quite rational 
(Hilton, 1988; 1990). When the cube is filled with explicit 
information, subjects use consensus, distinctiveness and 
consistency information in exactly the way that would be 
predicted by a rational model of causal induction (Cheng and 
Novick, 1990; Forsterling, 1989). As well as showing that 
subjects use base-rate information in the form of norms 
rationally, and do not underuse consensus information, the 
conversational model suggests that other biases such as actor- 
observer differences and success/failure asymmetries in 
explanation may be due to the implicit focus of why questions.
Moreover, the conversational model does more than clarify 
how causal explanations are made using the information specified
36
in Kelley's (1967) cube. It shows how causal explanations made 
from ordinary language follow discourse rules. Thus good 
explanations follow Grice's (1975) logic of conversation. 
Recognition of this helps understand why less probable 
explanations are preferred because they are more informative, how 
context can affect the perceived quality of an explanation, and 
why some kinds of explanation (e.g. goal-states) are preferred to 
others (e.g. script-preconditions).
The conversational model of causal explanation thus offers 
both parsimony and power. It is integrates existing models of 
causal attribution within a single framework as well as being 
consistent with general models of discourse processes. In 
addition, it generates new and fundamental questions about what 
makes a good explanation, such as what determines the trade-off 
between the probability and relevance of an explanation. Such 
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LLH P P P
LLL PxC PC PxC
LHH PxS PSC PxS
LHL PxSxC C PxSxC
HHH S S S
HHL SxC SC SxC
HLH Null PS P+S
HLL C PSC C
Key: Cs = Consensus
D = Distinctiveness 
Cy = Consistency
H = High 
L = Low
P = Person 
S = Stimulus
C = Circumstances (Occasion in Hilton and 
Slugoski, 1986)
x = An interaction effect 
+ = Two main effects
(Note: Orvis et al. (1975) did not distinguish 
between types of attribution)
Table J._!A comparison of the predictions made by Jaspars et al. ' s 
(1983 ) inductive logic model, Orvis et al.'s f1975) template- 
matching mode1. and Hilton and Slugoski1s (19861 abnormal 
conditions focus model.
Locus of explanation
Method of difference Other models
tJaspars,etc.) McArthur, etc)
Consensus ------------------- > Person Stimulus
JJistinctiveness------------> Stimulus Person
Consistency------------------ > Occasion Occasion
Table 2: ltelati ons between covariation and causal explanation






FauJ + Linda Help given
John + Linda V
George + Linda ?
Kingo + Linda V
Method of difference











Paul + Yoko 
Paul + Patti 
Paul + Barbara
•>
Table 4 : The logic of the method of agreement. as applied to 
person dispositional attributions
Target event: 'Ralph trips up over Joan dancing' 
Explanation: ’Something about Ralph’ and ‘Something about Joan'
P
P
Target event: 'Sally buys something on her visit to the supermarket* 
Explanation: 'Nothing special about Sally or the supermarket'
P
P
Kev : P = Target person present, P -  Other target persons present 
S -  Target stimulus present, IT» Other target stimuli present
Figure, i; 2 X 2  data-matrices for high consensus, low distinctiveness 



















Figure 2: Hypothesis generation and progressive 
localization ol cause
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